

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE—(ARMY)

CROSS REFERENCE

**SECRET**

INTELLIGENCE - PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION (A.I. (K))

**R.C.A.F.  
WAR ROOM**

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SECRET Date 24 SEP 1945

A.D.I.(K) Report No. 388/1945.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W. AS THE STATEMENTS MADE HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED AS FACTS UNTIL COMMENTED ON IN AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

GERMAN METHODS AND EXPERIENCES OF PRISONER INTERROGATION.  
(Dulag Luft).

1. An extensive German account of the organisation of Dulag Luft - later known as Auswerterstelle West - and the methods employed by the Germans in the interrogation of Allied P/W has recently come to light and is set out in translation in the present report. According to interrogators from Dulag Luft this treatise was prepared early in 1945, when the interrogation centre was partly evacuated from its site at Oberursel.

2. One of the most striking features of this document is the close similarity between the methods employed by the Germans and those developed by A.D.I.(K) in the course of the war. Both sides made use of common human weaknesses in a very similar way; whilst we had the advantage of the falsity of German propaganda and a disunited country, the German interrogators made a parallel use of surprising the Allied prisoner with a friendly approach which produced the reaction that "the Hun is not such a bad fellow after all". Similarly, both sides used the technique of surprising their prisoners with extremely detailed knowledge, thus bluffing them into supplying further information.

3. In reading this account one is given the impression that the writer has over emphasised the perfection of his own organisation and methods, a fault that is to be expected when it is known that the treatise was intended to impress "higher levels". The reader is, however, left with no doubt that the German interrogators were acutely aware of the intensive intelligence and security training which the Allied aircrew - particularly of bombers - were receiving.

4. In the later stages of the war the Germans improved their interrogation methods and borrowed many ideas from Allied practice. This improvement was based primarily on advice given by Von WERRA after his stay with A.D.I.(K) and subsequent escape from Canada via the United States in 1941. Repatriated German prisoners subsequently supplied further advice, whilst some Allied P/W gratuitously repeated the contents of their security lectures which the Germans promptly applied to their own use.

A.D.I.(K) and  
U.S. Air Interrogation.  
13th September 1945.

*S. D. Felkin*  
S. D. Felkin,  
Group Captain.

DISTRIBUTION:-

Air Ministry:- A.C.A.S.(I); A.D.C.P.; A.I.S.(1); A.I.S.(2) (2);  
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"PRISONER INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENTS EVALUATION  
AND THEIR INTELLIGENCE VALUE TO THE HIGHER COMMAND."

- I. ORIGINS.
- II. PEACE-TIME PREPARATIONS FOR THE INAUGURATION OF AN INTERROGATION UNIT.
- III. THE NECESSITY FOR A CENTRAL INTERROGATION UNIT.
- IV. THE ORGANISATION OF AN INTERROGATION UNIT.
- V. PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERROGATION CENTRE.
- VI. SIGNALS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE.
- VII. ORDERS BY THE AIR FORCE COMMAND ON THE TREATMENT OF AIR FORCE P/W'S FROM THE TIME OF THEIR CAPTURE TO THEIR DELIVERY AT THE INTERROGATION UNIT. (See Appendix).
- VIII. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN THE TREATMENT OF P/W'S ACCORDING TO THE ORDER.
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- X. THE INTERROGATION.
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- XII. THE EVALUATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EFFECTS.
- XIII. POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL INTERROGATION.
- XIV. CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER FORMATIONS.
- XV. SUGGESTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE LECTURES TO OUR ARMED FORCES BASED ON INTERROGATION EXPERIENCE.

I. ORIGINS.

1) On the methods, organisation and experience of P/W interrogation, as well as the extent and appreciation of results, there are no facts available from the First World War. It was possible to survey the overall situation without much difficulty because the air forces employed by both sides were small in comparison with those of the Second World War and they limited themselves more to reconnaissance rather than attempt actual bomber warfare, and a system was therefore unnecessary.

2) The operational German Air Force was quickly built up before the Second World War by employing the entire industrial strength of Germany. Only general details of the enemy's armament, its strength and its development potential were available at various centres which had no connection with each other. Above all, uniform preparations and the provision of the means for making an intensive study of the enemy Air Force immediately on the outbreak of hostilities were neglected, nor had thought been given to the systematic appreciation of statements made by captured enemy airmen.

3) With the outbreak of hostilities in the Second World War and the capture of British airmen, the possibility arose for the German High Command to discover the enemy's tactics and future plans and to utilise this information.

4) P/W interrogation was organised on a very small scale at first, without a clear line which was to be followed or definite aims, not to mention a theory of method. The information which was assembled frequently only served to satisfy the desire for sensational news and the detective story romanticism on the part of those on the distribution list. A systematic interpretation of the many details and a comparison with previous information, the assembly of a mosaic picture from innumerable small stones, was completely lacking at first.



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5) This situation remained unaltered during the whole first two years of the war. The urgent necessity for a more intensive study of P/W interrogation did not arise until the enemy Air Force began to be re-inforced, particularly when the United States also entered the war and commenced operating. The information assembled in this manner was then made use of because all other sources (diplomatic service, espionage), with the exception of the Interception Service, more or less failed.

6) The intensified operations of the enemy Air Forces also led to an increase in the number of P/Ws. The picture, which had been obscure and hazy until then, began to take shape in the minds of a few interrogators without being recorded or compiled in detail. When any of these persons left, his knowledge was lost with him.

7) Entirely of its own accord, actually more to facilitate the work of interrogation and in order to hasten the conclusion of the individual interrogation, it was found necessary to record the information obtained, so that with the increasing range of subjects, types of aircraft and tactics, used, it would be possible to refer to it at a later date for purposes of comparison.

## II. PEACETIME PREPARATIONS FOR THE INAUGURATION OF AN INTERROGATION UNIT.

An interrogation unit, by its nature, cannot be established until immediately before or at the outbreak of hostilities. In order to be in a position to supply the unit immediately with all the necessary information, the High Command must collect in peacetime, and hold in readiness, extensive data on the enemy Air Force, its organization, strength and plans. These must then be made available to the unit immediately.

When the war broke out in 1939 there was very little such information available, and this was incomplete. The information and records needed for the interrogation and evaluation work first had to be assembled in painstaking detail, partly from information supplied by the enemy, partly from information from other sources, such as the Interception Service and the reports of our agents. Valuable time and work was wasted on assembling data showing the details of the enemy Air Force. This would have been much more complete and could have been gathered with much less effort if it had already been done in peacetime. This experience shows that it is necessary for an Interrogation Unit to have the following data available in order to take up its work:-

### Organisation:

Composition, strength and equipment. Available airfields, their location, condition and the units stationed there (aerial photographs).

### Aircraft:

Types which are available and in development, their equipment, armament, performance data and use.

### Weapons and Equipment:

Armament and ammunition, bombs and bomb aiming devices and other flying instruments, including data on their use and performance.

### Navigation:

Navigational systems which are in existence and in development, their use and their performance.

### /Tactics:



Tactics:

Principles governing the employment of all types of aircraft, existing and planned attack and defence procedure, the issuing of orders and experiences from other theatres of operation.

Training:

Type, number, designation and location of all schools, length of the courses, the training methods and capacities. Type and extent of any planned extensions.

Personnel:

Composition and efficiency of all personnel, particularly aircrew. Leading personalities, such as Commanding Officers, etc., their individual characteristics and capabilities. A list of the officers of the Air Force in peacetime.

Production:

Location and capacity of all factories engaged in all branches of the aircraft industry. New developments and inventions, and the stage they have reached in aircraft construction, aircraft engines, weapons and instruments. Research and testing stations and performance reports.

Planning:

For the planning of the unit it will be necessary to collect, annotate and store at some central point travel books, lists, handbooks, maps of cities and other maps of all scales and projections, technical periodicals, illustrated newspapers, weeklies and magazines.

III. THE NECESSITY FOR A CENTRAL INTERROGATION UNIT.

One of the basic fundamentals in wartime is: that the more recent a piece of information the more value it has. This would mean that it would be most desirable to interrogate the P/W's and to make an evaluation of the captured documents and materials immediately after the aircraft is shot down, but this conclusion cannot be carried out in practice. The area over which aircraft are shot down is too great and interrogation officers cannot be available everywhere.

Experience has shown that a large organisation is required for the interrogation of a P/W, and for the effective evaluation of captured documents and materials. This can only be built up at some central point and cannot be moved about. Each P/W statement is only a small part of the jigsaw puzzle which can only be put together at the central unit. It alone can recognise the gaps and then fill them in. By the variety of the documents at its disposal, it can check on the authenticity of each statement or prove its inaccuracy to the P/W under interrogation. Furthermore, a central unit makes it possible for the interrogators and the evaluators to meet and exchange ideas and thus be able to work really efficiently. The disadvantage of interrogation as against evaluation of documents is that a 100% accuracy of the P/W statements cannot be relied upon. On the other hand, however, it has the advantage that the P/W's can be asked for information concerning any specific matters and they will give answers, whereas with documents one is dependent on what happens to be available.

The best results will come from the co-operation between both sources of information at some central point.

/Centralisation



Centralisation in the Second World War did not go so far, however, as the combined interrogation of P/W's of the western and the eastern theatres of operation. It was only natural that both units should be built up apart from each other because of the great distances involved, the difference in the languages and the different stages of development in the two Air Forces. This separation has shown itself to be both necessary and practical in every way.

The establishment of individual Interrogation Detachments in the African, later the Italian, theatre of operation did not constitute a violation of this principle of centralisation. The personnel of these outstations were men who had been well trained at the central unit and were able to take charge of interrogation on questions of immediate importance. Their main task, however, was to watch the interests of the central unit, and to see that the P/W's were sent to the Interrogation Centre as soon as possible.

#### IV. THE ORGANISATION OF AN INTERROGATION UNIT.

From the necessity for a central interrogation unit there arose the demand for suitable machinery which would: a) make efficient interrogation and evaluation possible, and: b) record, keep up to date, and place at the disposal of the interrogators all the information coming from other sources, such as the Interception Service, Aircraft Reporting Service, visual reports on the movement of aircraft and reports from agents and from the press.

The prerequisites for all these activities were that the P/Ws were properly received, searched and quartered in accordance with the security regulations combined with the requirements of the interrogators, and that the other work of the unit could be carried out in the immediate neighbourhood.

Through experience the following buildings were found to be necessary:

1) A P/W building with 200 single cells which had to be sound proof and escape-proof, with listening apparatus in 50 cells. The building also had to contain: rooms for the sentries, ample facilities for washing and de-lousing, a sick bay and reception rooms in which the P/Ws could be searched and recorded on arrival. In addition, an overflow to quarter these P/Ws who could not be put into the single cells due to a large influx of P/Ws.

2) Office building for the accommodation of the entire clerical staff. It was found necessary, for efficient interrogation, to provide an individual room for each interrogator.

3) Hospital. It was found to be extremely practical for the unit to be near a hospital to which the wounded P/Ws who could not be taken to the interrogation centre could be sent. In the hospital it was also necessary for the purposes of interrogation to have single rooms for the P/Ws. After the interrogation the P/Ws were transferred to the general wards.

4) Collecting camp. After the interrogation was concluded, the P/Ws were taken from their single cells and sent to a collecting camp where they awaited their evacuation. The camp consisted of 3 large huts with 10 rooms in each hut and 8 beds in each room. A collecting camp was found to be particularly practical because by sending the P/Ws there, a corresponding number of single cells in the P/W building were again made available.

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The following sections were found to be necessary for efficient interrogation and evaluation:-

- 1) Administrative Section: Responsible for the reception, quartering, welfare and evacuation of the P/Ws, i.e. passing the P/Ws through the entire unit. The following sub-sections were found to be necessary for this purpose:
  - a) Reception: The Reception personnel recorded, searched, de-loused and quartered the P/Ws on their arrival. All personal property and any other objects they may have had with them were taken from the P/Ws. The Reception itself had one of the most important tasks and it operated successfully in conjunction with the following sub-sections.
  - b) Transport Section: On instructions from the Interrogation Section it carried out the evacuation of the P/Ws to the collecting camp or direct to the nearest P/W Transit Camp.
  - c) Interpreters: The interpreters attended to the P/Ws during the time they were at the unit and supervised and carried out the privileges, such as permission to wash, the issue of books, and the like, which were granted to the P/Ws by the Interrogation Section. In addition, they were at the disposal of the Camp Officer for all interpreter duties he might have for them.
  - d) Examination section for personal property and other objects belonging to the P/Ws: This section examined and sorted out all the material brought in by the P/Ws. Whatever might prove of value in supplying information on the enemy was sent to the Evaluation Section; personal property, if unsuitable for purposes of evaluation, was registered and held in readiness and then returned to the P/W after the conclusion of the interrogation. Objects which could be used in attempting an escape were withheld and sent to the Security Section for examination. They were not returned to the P/W. All other objects, such as Air Force watches, which were the property of the enemy Air Force and were not an essential part of the equipment required by the P/W later, were withheld as booty and were made available to our own depots. Stereograms and administrative personnel were required for this purpose.
- 2) Security Section: The Security Section supervised in co-operation with the Administrative Section, the search for P/W escape materials and examined these if any were found. It was also responsible for seeing that the lodging of P/Ws was in accordance with the security regulations. It was in charge of censoring of letters written by P/W while they were at the Centre. The Security Section was also responsible for seeing that all security regulations in force were kept by the entire unit.
- 3) Interrogation Section: This section carried out the interrogation of all P/Ws. It was in charge of all sections which collected and filed the aids needed for carrying out the interrogation.



a) **Crash Report:** This section received and filed all reports from outstations on enemy aircraft and their crews shot down. It had to determine, on the basis of these reports alone, the composition of the crews, and the unit to which the aircraft was attached. It was found practical to give each aircraft shot down a number and to classify them according to type (fighter or bomber), and nationality. All documents and materials captured were also given this number, so that all details concerning an aircraft shot down could be found registered under a single number. The data gathered in this manner was made available to the interrogators.

b) **Card Index:** This section kept an alphabetical index of all names which became known to the unit either through interrogation or from other sources such as the press. These names were of aircrew still known to be in action. In addition to the name, each card listed all known information together with the source. With the help of this file it was possible to identify the incoming P/Ws and to confront them with a great deal of information, even before the interrogation began. This file was not the only source of information on the P/W prior to interrogation; the number on his identity disc also gave some clues as to the training the P/W had undergone. It was possible to reconstruct the system used in the distribution of personal numbers, when it was realized the men were given numbers in alphabetic order when they finished their training. By inserting the designation of the school in the corresponding group of numbers, which were verified by P/W statements and captured documents, it was not only possible to determine the school at which the P/W had concluded his training, but by following this system it was also possible to calculate the capacity of each school. It was the task of the card index section to assemble this additional valuable information.

c) **The Squadron History:** Its purpose was to record all information concerning the units of the enemy Air Force and to keep this information in separate folders for each known operational unit. It served as a basis for the absolute identification of each P/W under interrogation, and also helped to collect further information. The folders had to contain the following information: Aircraft types, location of base, details and photographs of the airfield, markings of the unit, type of operations and strength, aircraft numbers, aircraft equipment, W/T and R/T equipment and procedure in the unit. The folders also contained information on aircraft which had been reported as shot down giving the names of the crews that had been captured or killed.

In addition, this section also kept:

- 1) A diagrammatic survey of the organization of the enemy Air Force. The Order of Battle for the enemy Air Force was shown on maps which were always kept up to date.



- 2) A file of all non-operational units, including those in process of forming.

The Squadron History was based on the following: Evaluation of captured materials, interrogation, press cuttings, Wireless Interception Service, enemy news services, and information obtained by the Security Section (censorship of mail). A properly kept Squadron History was a valuable instrument in the hands of the Interrogation Section in breaking the silence of the P/Ws.

- d) Raid Reports Section: This section handled all information from our sources concerning air raids and was not derived from interrogation or captured documents. On the basis of this information it was possible to reconstruct the course of each raid. All reports from the following sources had to be placed immediately at the disposal of this section: Interception Service, Aircraft Reporting Service, the experiences and visual observations of all defence units concerned (A.A. and fighter units), foreign news services, and the reports of the High Command, with maps and weather reports attached. From all these sources this section made a preliminary report of each attack and had this available to the interrogators before they interviewed a P/W. Moreover, they pointed out to the interrogators, on the basis of this report, all possible questions arising from each attack. In the light of experience it was found necessary to prepare concise reports on each attack, in which all information was collated from our own units as well as from interrogation. By their nature, these reports could not be prepared for 10 to 14 days after the actual attack. A photostatic copy of a map showing the routes, etc., was attached to the report. For the information of the High Command, the results of interrogation and evaluation were given in a rush report and preliminary attack warning. The rush report contained, in a very brief form, all the information which was important to the High Command. The preliminary attack warning contained details of planned attacks which had not yet taken place. The distribution list was fixed in such a manner that copies were sent to those units which were interested in the report, either because of their location, or because of the subject of the report. The reports were transmitted by teleprint.
- e) Information Room: It was necessary to have a central place where the interrogators could keep up to date with all information acquired, and current problems arising out of the work. In this room both the original and compiled report could be found. Ground and air situation maps showing the routes taken by the attacking forces served to inform and stimulate the interrogators in a clear manner. A summary of all incoming crews, arranged according to the raid in which they took part, was also kept here and alongside each crew there was the name of the interrogator dealing with the case. In this way it was possible for the interrogators to contact each other, and

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collate their efforts on the same problems. In this way unnecessary duplication of work was avoided. One might, therefore, say that the information room performed the functions of a clearing house.

- 4) Press Section: The Press Section was supplied by outside formations with all available enemy and neutral press material. It evaluated this material from the point of view of the Air Force, translated it and made it available to the interrogators in suitable form. Daily questions of general interest were also briefly summarised in order that the interrogators could get an idea of the political and social conditions of the enemy countries. Such knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for successfully opening a conversation with the P/Ws. It has been found practical, in the case of press reports on similar subjects, not only to translate them, but also to compile a report based on various newspapers.
- 5) Photographic Section: This section was set up in order to make quick copies of important captured documents, and to make these available to other units. It was also possible to develop films captured in enemy aircraft. These were then placed at the disposal of the Interrogation Section for instructional purposes.
- 6) Interrogation Section: Methods of interrogation are discussed in detail in Section 5. The course of the interrogation is described in Section 6. The purpose of the following is to describe the manner in which interrogation on specific subjects was carried out. To begin with, it was found necessary to pursue a special subject in order to guarantee an exhaustive interrogation. This specialisation of Interrogators (hereinafter IO) was limited, however, so as not to run the risk of an interrogator being unable to interrogate on all subjects. When a large number of American P/Ws arrived, all IO's interrogated the Americans, and likewise when a large number of British P/Ws arrived, all the IO's interrogated British P/Ws. At first a sub-division between American and British P/Ws was provided for. Then a further sub-division was made in the case of the American P/Ws, some IO's taking American bomber crews only, others American fighters only. A similar sub-division was also made for the interrogation of British P/Ws.

The specialisation in the case of the British P/Ws went even further, and after the veil over the enemy tactics had been lifted, individual IO's were delegated to make an intensive study of the tasks of each group. This did not mean that the IO in question carried out all interrogations in connection with his Bomber Group, but that he was the one who informed the other IO's of the questions of the moment, in order that they might be answered as soon as possible. The interrogation of crews who had taken part in mining operations, or in attacks on convoys was carried out by the Naval IO who was attached to the Interrogation Unit as Naval Liaison Officer. He was responsible for all Naval matters in connection with interrogation and received the necessary briefing from the Navy.

If in the course of the interrogation it was found that a P/W under interrogation had any special knowledge, such as a special occupation in civilian life, former employment at



an aircraft factory, flights or experiments at an Air Force Experimental Station, had been an instructor for a long period of time, or had special technical knowledge of new radio equipment carried in aircraft, he was turned over to a specialist or technician for further interrogation after the purely tactical interrogation had concluded. In many cases it was impossible to conduct a second interrogation under a different IO, and for this reason the specialist or technician concerned was invited to tea or to a supper party, in the course of which the conversation was forced into the desired channels, and the interrogation was carried out in this way. Once the specialist had established contact with the P/W, it was possible for him to ask questions on further details in the course of a walk with the P/W. If the technical knowledge of the specialists and engineers attached to the unit was insufficient, corresponding experts, with or without knowledge of English, were called in and the interrogation was delayed until their arrival.

- 7) Evaluation of Captured Documents and Effects - See under XII.
- 8) Other Sub-Sections: The following were found necessary for proper administration:
  - a) A registry for all incoming and outgoing mail.
  - b) Orderly room for sorting, receiving and despatching of all service mail and the running of errands.
  - c) Duplicator press for making copies of interrogation reports.
- 9) Administrative Personnel: The administration of the unit was carried out in the same manner as is customary in all military units. The only special feature was that the administrative work of not only the German personnel, but also of the P/Ws was carried out, such as supplying their provisions and pay, and the confiscation and administration of escape and personal money of the P/Ws. In the matter of provisions, the unit had to be in a position to take in unexpected arrivals at all times.
- 10) The Company providing guard-duty: This company consisted of 5 platoons of "Landesschützen (Local Defence Units) which relieved one another at 24 hour periods of duty. They were responsible for guarding the P/Ws and for carrying out the security regulations. It was their duty to prevent the P/Ws from communicating with each other through the walls. They also took the P/Ws to the latrines and brought them from their cells to the Interrogation Officers.

#### V. PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERROGATION CENTRE.

A war establishment for a P/W Transit Camp had not yet been laid down when hostilities broke out in the Second World War. The responsible authorities had neglected even to take the matter into consideration, much less to make any preparations. From the very beginning, the establishment of the Interrogation Unit was continually being increased according to the requirements. When the number of P/Ws increased appreciably in 1944, more IO's and general personnel were required, and it was therefore decided to fix a sliding establishment for the Interrogation Unit.

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The following is a copy of this sliding establishment:

A) Staff:

- Commandant (Staff Officer).
- 1 Adjutant (Major or Hauptmann).
- 1 Senior W.C.O.
- 1 W.C.O. clerk for pay and accounts (Fw.).
- 1 W.C.O. i/c Clothing (Fw.), also W.C.O. i/c technical stores and equipment.
- 2 Clerks for special clothing and equipment of the P/Ws (Uffz.).
- 4 Clerks (including 2 Fw.).
- 6 Women Auxiliaries (typists) (including 2 for Drafting Section).
- 1 Cook (Uffz.).
- 1 Cook (Employee).

Telephone and Teleprinter Exchanges:

- Communications Officer (duties carried out by Camp Officer).
- 2 Mechanics for communications equipment (Uffz.) (including 1 for telephone, 1 for teleprinter).
- Women Auxiliaries for telephones and teleprinters.
- 1 E.T. Uffz.
- 5 E.T. drivers.
- 1 Motorcycle with sidocar, open.
- 3 Medium motor cars, open or closed.
- 1 Lorry, 2 tons, open.

Administration Section:

- 1 Officer in the special technical services.
- 1 Stores Oberfeldwebel.
- 1 Women Auxiliary (typist).
- 4 Stokers (on a wage).

Foreign Currency Section:

- 1 Adm. Ofw.
- 3 Clerks (2 Uffz., 1 other rank).
- 6 Women Auxiliaries (typists).

B) P/W Interrogation:

- 1 Director (Staff Officer).
- 55 Interrogation Officers (Staff Officers).
- 2 Interrogation Technical Officers.
- 50 Interpreters (including 20 Fw., 18 Uffz.).
- 23 Women Auxiliaries (typists).
- 7 Women Auxiliaries (artists for Situation and Raid Sections).
- 22 Women Auxiliaries for files (Aircraft shot down, P/W, Squadron History, etc.).

Camp Officer:

- 1 Camp Officer (Major or Hptm.) also Communications Officer.
- 3 Camp Personnel (including 1 Fw., 3 Uffz.).
- 6 Women Auxiliaries (typists).

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C) Security Section:

- 1 Director (Major or Hptm).
- 14 P/W reception personnel (including 5 Fw., 8 Uffz.).
- 3 Women Auxiliaries (typists).

D) Interpretation of Captured Documents and Effects, and Procurement of Information:

- 1 Director (Major or Hptm.).
- 1 Specialist (Hptm. or Lt.).
- 25 Interpreters (including 10 Fw., 10 Uffz.).
- 13 Women Auxiliaries (typists) (with knowledge of English).

E) Press Evaluation Section:

- 1 Director (Staff Officer).
- 3 Specialists (Hptm. or Lt.).
- 5 Assistants (Ofw. - Interpreters).
- 2 Women Auxiliaries (Interpreters).
- 2 Women Auxiliaries (Typists).

F) Photograph Interpretation Section:

- 1 Official as Director.
- 1 Photograph Interpreter (Ofw.).
- 2 Women Auxiliaries (Photograph Interpreters).
- 1 Woman Auxiliary (camera mechanic).
- 4 Photographers (including 3 for photographing P/Ws (4 Uffz., including 1 Fw.)).
- 4 Women Auxiliaries (laboratory assistants).

Total Establishment: 70 Officers, 97 Uffz., 34 Other Ranks, 1 Employee, 99 Women Auxiliaries, 4 Men on weekly wages, 1 Official.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS.

It was found that the work of an Interrogation Unit depends to a large degree on the proper functioning of the available communications equipment. It was essential that:-

1. The reports from the outside units feeding the interrogation centre with information arrived as quickly as possible, and that units responsible for tactical operations could contact the centre quickly and easily.
2. The information obtained from interrogation and evaluation could be forwarded as quickly as possible both to the High Command and to the operational units. It was part of the work of the centre to see that the operational units could make use of this information as quickly as possible.

For this reason, the unit had an extensive telephone and teletype network at its disposal. As a result of the intensified aerial warfare, long-term breakdowns of communications were the order of the day. This led to the necessity for an entire wireless overlap with the present network. This, however, could no longer



be fulfilled for technical reasons, and the only available substitute was a decimeter system, but its use was limited. For those reasons, the following requirements are needed for the communications system of an Interrogation Unit:

1. Telephone and teleprint lines to all superior commands of the Air Force.
2. Wireless communication with the same units for emergency service.

VII. See Appendix.

VIII. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN THE TREATMENT OF P/Ws ACCORDING TO THE ORDER (See Appendix).

The regulations on the treatment of P/Ws had been made available to all units of the Armed Forces. In practice, however, there were many difficulties, and many cases of independent action, as a result of which the G.A.F. Supreme Command issued an order to the following effect:

Concerning: P/W Interrogation and captured documents and equipment of enemy Air Forces:

It has been found that orders on the interrogation of enemy Air Force P/Ws and the examination of captured equipment are repeatedly being violated. In view of the small number of P/Ws and equipment captured, the safeguarding of even the most insignificant detail is of the utmost importance, and this material must therefore be handled methodically by one single unit. Attention is, therefore, again called to the following instruction:-

- 1) The capture of enemy Air Force P/Ws is to be reported immediately to the nearest German Air Force Station which will take over the P/Ws as soon as possible and send them on to the appropriate Interrogation Unit.
- 2) The interrogation of enemy Air Force P/Ws is exclusively a matter for the proper German Air Force units. Any interrogation whatsoever of enemy Air Force P/Ws carried out on the part of units of the German Army, or the German Navy, or civilian authorities is forbidden, even when the capture is made in operational German Army zones or in coastal defence areas.
- 3) The captured enemy Air Force equipment (aircraft, A.A. and communications equipment) is to be put under guard by the nearest unit, if possible while it is still intact. Any examination whatsoever of the above-mentioned equipment is forbidden. The safeguarding of the enemy equipment is to be reported immediately to the nearest ground unit of the German Air Force (Operational airfield, equipment park), who will take it over and effect the further examination, etc. It is requested that all subordinate units be notified of the above basic principles.

The following points show where difficulties and arbitrary action were encountered:-

- 1) Unsuitable persons repeatedly attempted to carry out a preliminary interrogation in order

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to determine the cause of the crash and to make a preliminary examination of the captured equipment. It was found that, because of insufficient technical knowledge, no positive results were ever achieved and that by the amateurish manner used in the interrogation of the P/W, he was given a feeling of security which was later detrimental to the progress of the actual interrogation.

- 2) Practical experiments carried out by trained Interrogation Officers attempting to take advantage of the effect of shock a few moments after the P/W had bailed out or had been captured, showed that the results were not much better; even in cases where the Interrogation Officer had all the auxiliary aids at his disposal, the results were no better than in ordinary cases.
- 3) The evacuation of the P/Ws to the Interrogation Centre was carried out with considerable loss of time due to difficult transport conditions. The chief reason for this was probably the fact that the escort personnel was granted up to 48 hours home leave after delivering the P/Ws to the Centre.
- 4) It was found impossible in practice to carry out the segregation of the individual P/Ws in transit as laid down in the general orders. In addition, it was impossible throughout the entire war, because of lack of personnel, to bring the members of a crew to the Interrogation Centre separately. The P/Ws therefore always had an opportunity (only a short one in many cases, but usually sufficient) to talk among themselves, exchange the details of their adventures and experiences, make plans for escape, and boost each other's sense of security for the interrogation.  
It was found particularly desirable to separate the P/Ws of two-seater aircraft such as Mosquitoes after their capture and during their transport to the P/W Transit Camp. These were usually very experienced crews and were also mentally and physically above the average. This lack of elasticity in the handling of individual cases was probably due to a certain extent to the failure of the Airfield Commanders to recognise the importance of P/W interrogation. For example, the fact that Mosquito crews were seldom captured and were therefore especially valuable was not sufficiently widely known.

In spite of this disadvantage, it was hardly ever found that crews prepared lies among themselves in order to give the same false information during the interrogation. This was due in part to the order that no false statements are to be made during interrogation, and in part to the fact that P/Ws had no idea

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what details were of interest to the interrogation officer.

Experience has shown, however, that crews which arrived at the Interrogation Centre separately and at different times, and who were not aware of each other's presence, could easily be played off against each other. The statements made by one P/W were held before another P/W as facts which had already been known for a long time, with the result that he also made a statement. Since P/Ws could never judge which details came from statements made by other comrades, and were usually amazed at the comprehensive knowledge of the Interrogator, it was possible to get even those who were still uncommunicative to talk.

- 5) Interrogation was particularly difficult in cases where the P/Ws from a crew were brought to the remains of the crashed aircraft either to identify the dead or to prove they came from that aircraft. In these cases, the P/Ws under interrogation always knew how many clues the interrogators held from the wreckage of the aircraft. Hints that the report of a technical salvage unit could be expected held no water. The P/Ws believed that by admitting at the crashed plane they had been members of the crew they had furnished sufficient evidence to prove they were members of the enemy Air Force. This brought to nought all attempts to get the P/Ws to prove they were serving in the Armed Forces. New and convincing arguments had to be found.
- 6) In innumerable cases captured documents and equipment had been salvaged with the greatest care, and sent promptly to the Interrogation Centre, usually with the P/Ws. In just as many cases, however, the salvage work was carried out very superficially so that valuable information and aids to the interrogator were lost. "Souvenir hunting" was the main reason for this superficiality. It may be mentioned here that the fault was partly due to the Interrogation Unit itself, because it failed to send large quantities of examined effects to the salvage units, and the pilots who had shot the aircraft down, and thus gave proof that effects were returned after examination. It is advisable to establish a specific section whose duty it would be to collect such "souvenirs" and send them to the appropriate units.
- 7) It was repeatedly found that the men who escorted the P/Ws from the Airfield H.Q.'s to the Interrogation Centre allowed themselves to become involved in general conversation with the P/Ws. Critical remarks showing disinterest in the war, the long duration of the



war and insufficient aloofness and soldierly pride often gave the P/Ws the feeling that the German armies and their leaders were war-weary.

- 8) At the beginning of the Second World War, after the first orders on the treatment of P/Ws and the transmission of reports had been issued, the information was received smoothly and quickly. As the war dragged on, however, the traffic on the telephone and teleprint lines increased, due to continual interruptions by enemy air attacks (these breakdowns often required days to repair), and personnel familiar with the work were replaced by auxiliary forces, ever-increasing difficulties arose, and in many cases, when the P/Ws arrived at the Centre, there were no reports (or incomplete ones) on where the aircraft had been shot down, the type of aircraft, etc. It is, therefore, advisable that the appropriate command should repeatedly point out the necessity for observing and carrying out the orders which have been issued, thus making new personnel familiar with their duties.

The thorough training of the salvage units, who are responsible for the salvage of the captured equipment, and later for the removal of the remains of the aircraft, is of the utmost importance. In addition to the purely technical side, i.e. the construction of the aircraft and the equipment in it, this training should also include an initiation into the tactical features.

In the salvage of enemy aircraft, it is important to the technical aircraft section, as well as to the interrogation, that the engineer of the salvage unit should be able to judge whether the aircraft in question is of a special type or not. By studying the labels on the equipment, and by noticing whether special equipment is on board, it is possible to determine the purpose for which the aircraft was being used, for example, Pathfinder aircraft or special aircraft used for radio jamming. If the engineer in charge of the salvage operations can, for example, determine from the aircraft markings that it belonged to a special unit, he can carry out his work with greater care, or call in other specialists. It would then be permissible to neglect other wrecks which are less interesting.

It was found that the salvage units had the necessary technical knowledge but lacked experience of the tactical aspect.

- 9) It is advisable to emphasise in instructions that only the salvage unit is permitted to salvage the film magazines in enemy fighter or bomber aircraft. A great deal of valuable

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information was lost due to improper handling during the "examination of the equipment".

- 10) Although instructions had made it clear that private property belonging to P/Ws and captured documents were to be kept separate for each crash, it was found that these orders were sometimes not carried out. Private property and enemy equipment, belonging even to several crashes, was thrown together and it was then impossible for the examiners at the unit to sort it out. Valuable information which could otherwise have been gathered from this material was lost in this way.

#### IX. PROGRESS OF AN INTERROGATION AT THE INTERROGATION CENTRE.

The purpose of this section is to describe the purely technical aspects of the interrogation, from the delivery of the P/W at the Centre to his evacuation to the permanent camp.

After the P/W was delivered at the Centre - either alone or with his whole crew - he was searched for compasses, files, escape money, saws, maps, skeleton keys, and other materials which might have helped him escape. After he had been searched, two photographs were taken of the P/W, one in profile and the other full face, together with a short description, so that warrants for his arrest could be issued if he escaped later.

If a large number of P/Ws (30 - 40) arrived simultaneously, it was found advisable to line them up in the open by crews before they were taken into the building to the Reception Section. It was found practical to separate the officers from the other ranks, or to have the incoming P/Ws line up by crews, and as this was usually carried out by a Gefreiter or Unteroffizier, none of the incoming P/Ws had any suspicions and they carried out these orders. In this way a great deal of work and time was saved which would otherwise have had to be taken to determine the make-up of the crews. These measures made it possible at times when there was a large influx of P/Ws to select only the most important men from each crew, and to send the others away immediately without interrogation.

After they had been searched for escape materials, the P/Ws were put into single cells, each of which contained nothing but a bed, a table and a chair. The members of the individual crews were in various parts of the building as far away from each other as possible in order to exclude all possibility of their communicating with each other through the walls.

The rooms were heated electrically in the winter in order to avoid signalling via the radiator system. The window glass was opaque, and the windows could only be opened with a special key.

#### The Reception:

The purpose of the reception was to determine whether the incoming aircrew would talk or not. It was attempted to group the P/Ws into crews purely by persuasion, and obtain the details of their crashes together with their units. This information served as the foundation on which the interrogation was later built up.

The person carrying out the reception gave the P/W a straightforward questionnaire. In addition to many personal questions, it

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contained questions on the crash, the P/W's unit and the composition of the crew. Its purpose was to record and identify the P/W.

The main duties of the reception were:-

- 1) The psychological assessment of the P/W from the point of view of whether he would be suitable for interrogation or not. This also assisted the interrogators when large numbers of P/Ws arrived at the same time.

In the eyes of the P/W, the reception was a pure formality and therefore had to be carried out quickly. As it was impossible to give a comprehensive psychological and character assessment in such a short time, the assessment took more of a descriptive nature. At first the P/W was allowed to talk freely in his own fashion. His conduct, his willingness or refusal to answer the questionnaire were described in such a manner that the Interrogation Officer had at least a superficial idea of how the P/W had conducted himself during the reception.

Extreme caution was necessary on the part of the person carrying out the reception. By mishandling the situation the receptionist could spoil the P/W for further interrogation.

The reception is not an interrogation. The idea of drawing information out of the P/W at all costs was a misplaced ambition on the part of the person carrying out the reception, and robbed the interrogators of many aids to their later work.

- 2) The exertion of influence on the P/W in order to make him willing to talk.

An important point was to make it clear to the P/W that the reception and interrogation were inescapable obstacles in his way to his permanent camp, unless there was some intervention on the part of the person carrying out the reception. This method never failed except in the case of P/Ws with a strong will power and mental resistance. Experience showed that such gestures greatly increased the willingness of P/Ws to talk and more or less removed their final doubts, particularly after several days spent in the single cells.

The actual interrogation was carried out at first in the individual cells. It turned out later, however, that it was more practical to carry out the interrogation in the Interrogation Officer's room, where sufficient maps and pictures and diagrams of the chain of command in the enemy Air Forces were available.

In most cases the initial interrogation was not entirely successful and the P/W was sent back to his cell, to be called back for further interrogation a few days later. During this time the P/W could neither wash nor shave himself and he had no books to read. In most cases the effect of a few days' solitary confinement was that the P/W was at least willing to start a conversation, and in the course of this conversation he would supply the desired information.

His request for permission to wash and shave himself and to be given a book to read was then granted and the interrogation was either continued or broken off, depending on the importance and the function of the P/W under interrogation.

The meals during the interrogation period were adequate, but

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kept down to a minimum so that the P/W would want to acquire some International Red Cross packages as soon as possible. In cases where P/Ws remained at the Centre for long periods, the issue of additional food at the P/W's request was found particularly effective as he then showed his gratitude by talking. By treating the P/W well, he was made to feel he was under an obligation. After interrogation, the P/W's personal property was returned to him, and he then awaited his evacuation to his permanent camp either in his cell, or in a special over-flow along with the other P/Ws who had already been interrogated. Interrogation after P/W had been in the overflow or a permanent camp was not very effective. It was found better to keep the P/W at the Interrogation Centre a little longer and settle all questions there rather than interrogate him again later.

The sentries in the building which contained the single cells were old men who did not know any English. The detailing of a number of interpreters to supervise the personal needs of the P/Ws, to carry out their privileges, such as permission to shave, bathe or wash themselves and to take showers, to issue books, to transfer them from one room to another and to return their personal property was found to work out well.

Slightly or severely wounded P/Ws who required the immediate attention of a doctor were also delivered at the Interrogation Centre. Some of them were so severely wounded that it was impossible to accommodate them in the Centre. They were taken to a hospital in the neighbourhood, put in single rooms and then interrogated on the spot.

The accommodation and food at the hospital was on a peacetime basis, and for most P/Ws their stay at the hospital was a real holiday compared with what they had gone through from the time they took off on their last mission till the time they reached the Centre. The results of interrogations in this atmosphere were correspondingly meagre.

In the first place the Interrogation Officer could not carry out the interrogation as forcibly because of his own feelings towards the state of the P/W's health, added to which the P/W had no desire to be moved from the hospital, where he felt he was particularly comfortable. He had everything he needed: care, medical treatment, a decent bed and good food. Only after numerous interrogations, and a long stay in a single room with nothing to do all day were results obtained. Very good results were obtained by putting a German Interrogation Officer, who was actually sick, but who soon recovered, into the same room with a P/W after a certain lapse of time and the P/W had lost his initial shyness.

In cases where the P/W's wounds were not serious and where he had recovered after a few days, evacuation to the less comfortable cells at the Interrogation Centre was found effective, and in most cases brought quick results.

The care of the wounded in the hospital was in the hands of elderly medical orderlies. The use of nurses who could speak English well and who could carry out general interrogations in addition to caring for the wounded was tried experimentally in a few cases, but this practice was not continued. If suitable nurses were used, it would be possible to get much better results by this method of interrogation in hospital.

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X. THE INTERROGATION.

The necessity for interrogation arose from the fact that there was a wealth of information in captured documents without a key to reveal it. A talkative P/W was able to supply this key, and consequently scientists were able to benefit by the successes and failures of the enemy.

Although the following information represents the experiences of a large group of interrogators, it can hardly be considered a "golden rule for interrogation". There is no such thing, just as there is no "golden rule for living".

The following points will be discussed in detail:

- 1) The foundation for the interrogation.
- 2) The aim of the interrogator.
- 3) The P/W under interrogation.
- 4) The Interrogation Officer.
- 5) The method of interrogation.
- 6) The result of the interrogation.

1) The Foundation for the Interrogation.

The interrogation is not a single act, it is an engagement; it is the last battle which the P/W has to go through before he is withdrawn from active service forever.

The course, scope, duration and success of the interrogation depend on whether and how clearly the P/W recognises the character of this battle.

His weapons are his intelligence training, and his character traits.

These two factors influence the interrogator more than any other external circumstances. One must, therefore, not overrate the importance of the mental shock caused by the last air battle, or the circumstances of the P/W's parachute descent and capture, and their effect on his mental balance. The youthfulness and general robustness of the P/Ws help them to overcome these mental shocks more quickly than the uninitiated would imagine. The P/W, when he first lands, does not as one might think bemoan the loss of his freedom, but recalls such trivialities as the chocolate he has left behind in his locker, and how his comrades, more lucky than he, will devour it in his absence. He is no more an exception than the P/W whose thoughts fly to the extra large steak he was promised on his return. There might be easygoing exaggeration and even a sort of grim humour in these remarks, but still they prove that the mental shock was not very great to the P/W.

When he first comes in contact with the German military, the P/W usually feels himself bound to absolute silence by the orders he has received at home. This was always the case the longer the P/W was in contact with the members of his own crew (e.g. in transit), during which time each boasted the others' security.

The memory of these orders only dies gradually, but hints from the interrogators on the futility of keeping up his unyielding attitude, all persuade the P/W to relax and converse naturally.

In order to grasp the mental status of the P/W at the start of the interrogation, it is important to know whether the P/W has

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any idea of either the interrogation itself or the German interrogation camp.

He may have received briefing in the course of his intelligence lectures, which are usually comprehensive and intensive. These conceptions are, however, very varied, depending on the character and imagination of the Intelligence Officer giving the lecture. For example, some expect to find bad, almost brutal treatment, whereas others are disappointed when they are not treated "like kings". The most important fact is that the P/W has been torn from his customary ways of living and thinking.

In spite of the intelligence lectures, he is often not able to picture or adapt himself to his new living conditions. Many forget that all their movements will be guarded from now on, that they will not be able to move one step without a sentry watching them. The last battle lies behind them, the last air fight, perhaps even an unsuccessful attempt to escape before capture. In many cases the whole war seems to lie behind them, so that such remarks as "We've had it" and "It's all over for us now" can frequently be heard. These remarks show that the P/Ws have forgotten the combat character of the interrogation.

The interrogation cannot be carried out immediately after the parachute or crash landing for technical and psychological reasons. There are always a few days in between, days filled with inconvenience and longing (for something to smoke, a chance to wash or talk to somebody, etc.) and in most cases this longing is the P/W's downfall.

When conducting an interrogation, one must avoid the idea of a legal cross-examination, or that the P/W should have a feeling of guilt in supplying information in the form of a confession. If the P/W has any regret, then it must only be for the abnormal conditions of war which force everyone to do things contrary to their nature.

The closer we get to the end of the war, the greater is the fear of P/Ws that they will later have to face a court-martial for statements made during interrogation. Until the conviction that Germany cannot win the war is shaken, it is impossible for the Interrogation Officer to talk down these scruples and fears. He can only attempt to evade this whole thorny question.

It is remarkable that most P/Ws show complete ignorance of the methods of interrogation officers, in spite of their intensive intelligence training, and warnings for all eventualities after their capture. As a matter of fact, it is even possible to hide and completely disguise the combat character of the interrogation and, therefore, its actual purpose. In such cases the P/W, after exhaustive and usually productive interrogation, often asks when the actual interrogation is going to begin.

## 2. The Aim of the Interrogation.

The aim of the interrogation is not to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the P/W's statements - more will be said on that subject later - but rather to break the silence which leads to the answering of "guided" questions; "guided" not in the sense of an answer influenced by suggestion, but rather that each answer should be a part of the invisible threads which the interrogator holds in his hands.

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The gathering of information about the enemy is by no means the only aim of the interrogator. As well as obtaining information which will materially assist the German defence forces, he must, at the same time, try to improve and develop the tools of interrogation, which include the various files on units and names, the history, composition and function of each unit, and photographs of aircraft types and equipment. These can only fulfil their purpose as "convincers" (meaning the suggestive claim that "that's all old stuff") if they are kept up to date by current observations.

In the long run, these interrogation props also supply direct information about the enemy, for example on the enemy strength, transfers, creation of new units, etc. Questions on tactical, technical and matters of organisation will generally form the basis for the interrogation. Questions on training will only be taken up as matters of secondary importance. Strategic information of operational value will be rare (such information will only come from high-ranking officers who are willing to talk), as the ordinary pilot or air gunner is too occupied with his job to be able to express an opinion on strategic questions. More often than not they only repeat what they have read in the newspapers.

Another aim of an interrogator is to answer questions of current importance and fill in the gaps in available information about the enemy.

As a result of the limited military knowledge of the P/Ws (which is less evident among the R.A.F. P/Ws than among the Americans), they presume our information about the enemy consists only of innumerable individual observations. The Interrogation Officer alone, with his tactical and technical knowledge, can unite these to a whole.

### 3. The P/W under Interrogation.

An attempt to describe the typical P/W must be based on the fact that no nation has a definite type of national. Such generalisations can only be used as working hypotheses, otherwise false conclusions will be reached. It is true, of course, that the social structure of the country the P/W comes from must be studied in order to reach conclusions on his background and education. Furthermore, the difference between officers and other ranks must be pointed out. This difference is, however, a result of the military traditions and customs of the country in question, and in considering it it would be false to make use of conceptions based on German standards of education and training for officers and other ranks in assessing enemy standards.

In addition, allowances must be made for the difference in the conduct of bomber and fighter aircrew. The placidness of a good many bomber crews is not shared by the fighter pilots, who are naturally more active and highly strung and can satisfy their desire for activity in individual actions.

If the above mentioned points are taken into consideration, it will be realised the more intelligent the P/W, the more he will talk, in contrast to one of a taciturn nature. With a little exaggeration it might be said that the smarter the P/W mentally, the easier will he become a victim of the interrogator.

If the more intelligent P/Ws are more likely to fall during the interrogation, then it follows that it is very difficult to get

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an indifferent P/W to talk. In this fact lies the biggest and most effective weapon the P/W holds during the interrogation. Indifference and an average education prevent the P/W from acquiring military knowledge before his capture, thus rendering an interrogation useless.

In order to prove finally that there is no uniform classification of the typical P/W, it must be pointed out that those P/Ws who are interrogated in hospitals, or after they have been in hospitals, react quite differently and do not respond to the interrogation in the same manner as the P/Ws who are brought for interrogation immediately after their capture.

A further difference, as a matter of fact one of the most important, lies in the degree and quality of the intelligence training each P/W went through at some time or other in his military career. This training seems to have been more intensive and effective in the case of bomber crews than with the fighter pilots. There are certain units from which a good intelligence training can be expected in advance.

It generally makes no difference whether the P/W was shot down on one of his first operations or after he had done a lot of operations. There are just as many examples of old and experienced hands giving free rein to their need for telling somebody their experiences, as there are of inexperienced crews starting to talk under the pressure of unaccustomed experiences they have gone through.

Of course, all these differences cannot belie the fact that there is a large number of common traits which, with all due caution, can be considered as national characteristics. This uniformity, which can clearly be determined in spite of all limitations, should not cause surprise. All the men of the enemy Air Forces are fundamentally the nation's elite, at least as far as their physical health and their military fitness are concerned. The majority of them are between 20 and 25 years old, which in itself is an important characteristic. All these P/Ws under interrogation are youths, almost children, and their naivety, their taking everything as a game, and their primitive habits of thought must be taken into account.

To sum up, it may be said that willingness to talk is an essential characteristic of any personality, and is only conditional on the nationality of the P/W in small measure, if at all.

#### 4. The Interrogation Officer.

An attempt to list the necessary qualifications for an Interrogation Officer could only result in a general list which would have surprising similarity with that for any other occupation. Every occupation and every profession always demands the highest qualifications. Let us tackle this problem from the enemy viewpoint, that is with the question: What conception does the P/W have of the Interrogation Officer? These ideas are absolutely concrete as a result of the intelligence lectures which have repeatedly been mentioned here.

They see in the Interrogation Officer a mixture of detective and captor; a man with a shrewd intellect who, for the moment has power over them, perhaps even the power of life and death. Since the Interrogator is a German, he is fundamentally intelligent; since he is a "Fascist" he is a man who uses sinister methods (by this the

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chain of thought soon leads to the well-known Gestapo).

The P/W expects to find in him above all a clever and determined person who will make use of all the supposedly unlimited means at his disposal. If he should show himself to be human, or even a good fellow, then it can only be a queer form of camouflage used in order to lull the vigilance of the victim. To sum up he is about as harmless as a wolf in sheep's clothing. Of course, this somewhat dismal picture of the German Interrogation Officer will be embellished by the P/W with all kinds of personal touches, and later put in a more friendly light.

In most cases the Interrogator's role as an officer will give him a certain amount of authenticity right from the beginning; particularly when promises and assurances are given and, moreover, given in a definite form, they are more likely to be believed unconditionally. An opening on these lines often results in the first penetration into the P/W's defensive armour, which has just been described.

More important still, is the P/W's surprise when he finds that the Interrogator does have a sense of humour. Such discoveries are, at first, regarded with mistrust, just as though there might be some mistake. But response to a second joke is then all the more cordial, and the child-like disposition and strong instinct on the part of the P/W for a game come to the fore.

An outsider probably assumes a complete knowledge of the enemy language is an essential prerequisite for a successful interrogation. This is by no means the case. Excellent knowledge of the language is as little a guarantee of success, however, as a limited knowledge of the language is a hindrance. It may be said, however, the more comprehensive the vocabulary of the Interrogator, and the more fluently he can express himself, the quicker he will establish the essential human contact with the P/W.

This is particularly true in the case of all "diversionary conversations", for example at a tea party, or when a political interrogation is in progress, for which the Interrogator must also have a comprehensive knowledge of the country, its leaders, institutions and history.

Another qualification that the Interrogator should possess is to be over a certain minimum age, and be able to put on the air of a man of the world, and face the P/Ws, who are mostly very young, with a corresponding air of authority and good judgement. It would be senseless to fix a definite age limit, or even to suggest a suitable age, but the use of "elderly gentlemen" is precluded as the requirements of an Interrogator are a quick, elastic and retentive mind. It must, of course, be understood that the term "old" applies only to the Interrogator's mental ability and not to his age.

The question of rank must be considered, and although the rank of the Interrogator is not a deciding factor, it does carry some weight, the main thing is that he should be an Officer. Even when a Gefreiter has had to interrogate a Group Captain or Colonel, this considerable handicap did not always bar the way to a successful interrogation.

It has been shown how an interrogation is a battle with mental and psychological weapons, and it follows, therefore, that

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the most important factor at the outset is the personality of the interrogator. His knowledge of the technical standards and organization of the enemy Air Forces is only of secondary importance.

Every Interrogation Officer can study on his own the importance of the effect of his personality, and see when he is in danger of losing control of himself either from fatigue or some other reason; even when he becomes angry he loses balance, and every fluctuation in his mental balance loses some of his personal effect, and therefore decreases the success of the interrogation.

#### 5. The Method of Interrogation.

It has already been said that the interrogation is an engagement and not an official act, nor is it a standard procedure in accordance with a prescribed formula. It is a battle with only mental and psychological weapons, and covers a very wide range. The means used in the fight and the methods of attack are absolutely inexhaustible, for instance, we have the frontal attack, with the direct and blunt question, as well as the pincers movement in which contradictions are used to play off the P/W's statements against one another.

We recognize the feint attack, in which the Interrogator bluffs his way through, as well as the surprise attack, in which the Interrogator himself talks of the most secret matters, and thereby lays them aside as "ancient history". Some P/Ws will succumb to a war of attrition by repeated interrogation, others fall straight away for the interrogation which has the cloak of a harmless conversation, and when they have given the Interrogator all he wants, they still wait for the interrogation to begin.

During an interrogation, everything depends on whether the P/W is aware that a battle is taking place and whether he knows of, and is prepared to use, his two weapons, to remain silent and to lie.

A word here about the average P/W's method of lying would not be out of place. If the P/Ws ever attempted to lie at all, they did it in such a clumsy manner, that they usually fell into the pit they had dug for the Interrogator, being themselves untrained and rather slow. They were caught in their lies very quickly, and then acted straight away like schoolboys who had been caught, and allowed their secrets to be drawn from them without any difficulty.

A P/W is all the stronger if he has learned to remain silent, and that is the aim of his intensive training which continues up to the last day of his active service. If he steadfastly, and without creating a scene, limits himself to giving the details he is allowed to give, namely his name, rank and serial number, then he deprives the Interrogator of all his weapons. But if he relaxes in his vigilance for even a moment, he is liable to stumble into an answer and thereby lodge the hook between his teeth which will open his mouth again and again.

Every P/W makes up his mind at the start not to talk, and there are two ways to break down this resistance. Either the information is wrested from him, piece by piece, until defeated and exhausted, he has told everything, or - and this is by far the most refined and subtle, and without doubt the more successful method - resistance is nipped in the bud by lulling the P/W to sleep to get him off his guard. Boxing until the knockout or the

/surrender



surrender is the one method, jiu-jitsu, the "gentle art" with the nerve-paralysing holds, is the other.

In boxing, the question stands at the beginning of each round, and the answer at the end. Everything physical is connected with this direct method of attacks, the lack of movement in the cell, the lack of fresh air and facilities for personal hygiene, the lack of something to smoke, the lack of adequate meals, and above all the meals to which the P/W is accustomed. Added to this is the fact that the P/W sits facing the dazzling light from the window, while the Interrogator asks the questions from the shadows.

Threats to prolong the solitary confinement, or failure to recognise a victim as a P/W with proper status, all play a part. Sternness, sarcasm and even cynicism are used here. The resistance which repeatedly blazes up is forced down by exhaustive interrogations. The statements of his own comrades may be used to force the first confirmation, which may be given simply by a nodding of the head, or just by the fact that the P/W does not contradict. Evident or imaginary contradictions are held up to him, misunderstandings are deliberately caused, and in the case of braggarts resistance can be broken with the provocative remark: "You wouldn't know anything about the matter in question because it is too difficult for you to understand."

The other method of attack, the more gentle and more unobtrusive, is based on the idea that resistance will show itself in some form of tension, either external or internal. The secret here is, therefore, relaxation and the ways to get there are more numerous than in the case of the hard fight.

The P/W's training will play its part in emphasising the contrast between what he has been led to imagine of the interrogation and interrogator, which was something based on fear and repugnance, and what actually confronts him in reality. The contrast between the bareness of his single cell and the comforting and friendliness of the interrogator also does its part. The interrogation room is light and often has flowers in it. Familiar maps hang on the walls, together with pictures of the beloved aircraft types, and the long-missed cigarettes lie temptingly close.

The Interrogation Officer himself is friendlier than had been expected, but not too friendly. He does not offer a cigarette immediately - that would look too much like bribery. A free and easy conversation is started, while standing in front of the large wall map, or leaning against the table, or sometimes even sitting on it. In order that he can relax his cramped physical bearing, there is a pencil in front of the P/W, as if by accident, something for him to play with. (The child of nature will use it to clean his fingernails, the nervous P/W will play with it like a child, and hardly anybody can resist the temptation to touch it in some way).

The ice is usually broken with a joke. Jokes and humour must run through the whole interrogation. A sympathetic enquiry after the P/W's wounds, his wife and children, and his mother, who will all worry about him at home, a sympathetic understanding for the P/W's plight, a show of indignation if he has been abused, and the apparent flattering when he is told he is considered a particularly intelligent person, far above the average, all help to break down and dissolve his resistance.

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In some cases where the disarming is achieved quickly and easily, only a few of these manifestations of sympathy are required to satisfy the melting desire to talk. A bare answer to a direct question is then no longer the aim of the interrogator. Instead, the P/W must tell his own story, he must "open up", give life to memories, tell something new. The aim is not the answer, but rather the report, and the Interrogator must keep the flow of speech in the desired channels by means of occasional objections, confirmations and incidental questions. The whole thing has more the character of a consolidated report, or shop talk, covering P/W's experiences and technical knowledge, rather than a single statement.

It is essential, therefore, that the P/W recognises in the Interrogator an expert who understands the questions under discussion, and a person to whom all the technical terms and slang words do not have to be explained first, who on the contrary can surprise the P/W by spicing his conversation with these terms. The second point is that the Interrogator must offer something that supposedly comes from the German Air Force, and which is news to the P/W. A good way is for the Interrogator to describe the installations and experiences of the enemy Air Forces, but present them as a picture of the German Air Force, so that the P/W reaches the desired conclusion that the two opposing Air Forces are so much alike that it is impossible to betray any secrets.

It is of course clear that this type of interrogation can be carried out most easily in conjunction with a fully laden tea or supper table. It is much easier to hold a conversation while sitting in soft, deep, club chairs, while smoking a cigarette, and sometimes even with some alcohol, than it would be across a stiff desk. A short walk along a pleasant countryside will always give a suitable introduction. When the P/W is in this mood he will often unburden his heartfelt desire to inform his relatives of the fact that he has escaped death, and will ask permission to write home. This request is granted in the light of an "exception". At the conclusion of this ideal method of interrogation, which is by no means a rare occurrence, we have not only a complete report, but also the personal thanks of the P/W for the good treatment and reception, along with the absolutely sincere desire to meet again after the war in order to take up the threads of personal friendship.

The Interrogator will make use of three main sources of information in the course of an interrogation. Firstly, he will determine whether any material from the personal property of the P/W, or the equipment of the aircraft can give any suggestions for the interrogation. Not even the very smallest piece is valueless in this connection, as it might give the P/W the impression that a great deal, perhaps everything, is already known and that in withholding information he would only prolong his stay in a single cell. It is a surprising fact that the average P/W has only a vague idea of whether any and if so what kind of evidence was found on his person. All these little pieces together give a complete picture.

Secondly, he will attempt to compare the statements of other P/Ws, evaluate them on the basis of each other, play them off against each other, and finally assemble them into a complete picture. He holds the threads in his hands, so that the P/W can neither recognise the gaps in the enemy's knowledge, nor tell when the individual statements have joined to form a complete picture. The Interrogator must always try to create the impression that his information is thorough and complete without need of confirmation, and that the interrogation only serves to identify the P/W, in the atmosphere of expert to expert.



A really childish mentality is prevalent in this connection, as most P/Ws would rather believe that the information, which actually came from the statements of other P/Ws, was derived from German espionage than suspect their own comrades of that which they are just about to do, namely make statements and reveal information.

Time may be mentioned as the third important factor. The seeming impossibility of obtaining any given piece of information on the first day of interrogation very often becomes possible on the next day, and even probable on the third and fourth days. The relative primitiveness of the P/Ws, combined with their youth, make it necessary for them to have contact with human society, in fact, this need is as great as their need for food and drink. The majority of P/W cannot withstand the softening influence of waiting in solitary confinement. Hurried interrogations, when the P/W realises the urgency, are, therefore, rarely among the most successful.

The Interrogator must always be in strict control of the interrogation owing to the fact that its course can never be determined beforehand. This is not always so simple as the questions do not necessarily follow in factual and logical order. The chain of thought coupling one deduction with another will never be a logical structure. Nevertheless, the P/W will be unable to see the thread which connects all the statements, answers, fragments of thoughts, and materials used as pieces of Evidence.

The association of ideas should really be made use of as much as possible as it represents an axiomatic and voluntary form of thinking in which reason and logic are almost eliminated. For example, one method of obtaining the names of members of a squadron is to ask first about the ones already known. In order to stir up the P/W's memory, i.e. in reality in order to lull his conscience to sleep, the P/W is given the first letter of the name. As soon as he gives the whole of the first name, this process can be repeated for the second and third names. If the P/W is then asked for the unknown name of the fourth officer, it may be expected with some certainty that he will not wait for the Interrogator to give him the initial letter as a help, as he is by now convinced everything is known anyway. The remaining names will be obtained in this way, and the P/W will seldom notice at which point the Interrogator has withdrawn the helping hand (the initial letter).

According to the enemy's regulations, any statements beyond the P/W's name, rank and serial number are considered military treason, high treason. This rule, which even the most childish and indifferent P/W knows, must be cloaked from the very beginning. It all depends on taking off him the burden of this treason, or at least making it lighter, i.e. to convince him that it is impossible for him to betray anything because everything has already long been known; that the many questions only serve to satisfy bureaucratic curiosity; that the Interrogator is only a victim of the red tape which exists on both sides; and finally that there is no way out for him other than the one taken by thousands of others who have been in the same position as he is in, and who have also talked, without exception. If it is possible to supply a few obvious but not humiliating examples of this, then the last bit of resistance is often broken.

The flow of speech will only be forthcoming to the interrogator who has made the P/W feel that he understands his position, and not to the interrogator who humiliates him. For this reason the sordid business transaction: "You betray this and that to me and in return you will be given better food and will be released sooner" will not have much chance of success in a straightforward form. Even though

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the Interrogator actually does follow these lines, it is better if both act as though they were not aware what game was being played.

For this reason, the Interrogator should make as few notes as possible in the presence of the P/W, and what notes he does make should be limited to information which the P/W will recognise as bureaucratic requirements in connection with forms and formalities. The retentiveness of the Interrogator will naturally limit the number of details concerning figures and proper names, which can be retained without making notes. One should, nevertheless, attempt to limit the notes of these details, or if made at all, then they should be written as surreptitiously, and as unobtrusively as possible.

It is often possible to overcome these rather technical difficulties by calling in a second interrogator, so that the emphasis is less on an "interrogation" and more on a "conversation". This does not mean that the two interrogators must necessarily agree with one another, on the contrary, one must contradict the other - with reasonable arguments - in order not to show opposition but rather to maintain the character of an actual discussion. In this way the P/W will be forced to give his opinion.

Interrogations with two Interrogators will not generally be successful, if only for the fact that the Interrogator must first establish personal contact with the P/W, which is much simpler when alone.

A particularly difficult form of interrogation is that of sick or wounded P/Ws in hospitals. Without consultation with the doctor it will hardly be possible for the interrogator to grasp the mental and physical condition of the P/W. All the normal factors which have such a strong effect in the case of a healthy P/W are missing in the case of an interrogation in hospital; the time-factor (a sick person is too concerned with the progress of his recovery), physical inconveniences (these must be avoided in a hospital in order to speed up the recovery), and the lack of company all have less effect on the sick, who occupy themselves with their own condition, and are possibly not capable of taking part in the life around them, than on the healthy, who are starving for something with which to occupy themselves.

This explanation of the various methods of interrogation will in some way answer the questions with which every outsider and Interrogator will be confronted when he takes over his duties for the first time.

## 6. The Result of Interrogation.

Outsiders are surprised at the volume and variety of information gained through interrogation. They are also just as surprised when they hear that it was obtained without bringing pressure to bear; no thumb screws, no narcotic injections to reduce the P/Ws' vigilance and increase his willingness to talk or whatever might be expected by an outsider from reading novels and seeing motion pictures.

In spite of the fact that there is no hard and fast rule for methods of interrogation, there is inevitably an underlying principle for every interrogation. In the wealth of information held on the enemy, matters of operational importance naturally take first priority, and it follows, therefore, that questions on tactics, technical matters, and organisation, are the interrogator's first concern, in order to confirm and keep a check on old information and new developments.



At this point, a few words must be said concerning political interrogation, which is more a "by-product" of military questioning, and only comes into the limelight in exceptional cases. So many factors of moods and feelings and other imponderable circumstances are inherent in this form of interrogation that it would be well to remember its possibilities and its limitations. In the first place, the members of the enemy Air Forces are an élite body of definite social classes and without much difference in their ages. They are, therefore, by no means just a small example of public opinion, such as the group chosen by the Gallup Institute for its polls.

The P/Ws usually do not have any political knowledge superior to that of an interested newspaper reader, they are dependent on the newspapers, the motion pictures and their daily conversations for their opinions. As a matter of fact most P/Ws are below the standard of mentality of the average newspaper readers, as they read the newspapers in the following order, first the puzzle corner, then the sports news, then the home news and finally, if at all, the news from the various theatres of war and the news on international politics. Most P/Ws, therefore, have no political knowledge or ambitions.

In spite of all these reservations the political statements of the P/W can, nevertheless, be assessed as a section of public opinion. Furthermore, such statements not only give the P/W's own opinion, but also reflect the views and opinions of a wider circle of friends, and people of the same age and occupation.

The more voluminous the interrogation results become, and the larger their proportion to the total information on the enemy, the more important becomes the question of reliability of the statements. An assessment of their reliability must proceed from the fact that the P/W will, if he talks at all, make use of deceit as a weapon of defence.

In the first place, his military superiors have instructed him to supply no information other than his name, rank and serial numbers. In some cases a shrewd lecturer has added that lies must be avoided under all circumstances as they only bring on countermeasures which will break all resistance on the part of the P/W. If he lies at all, then he lies on his own responsibility so to speak, and such lies are usually so primitive that they are soon recognised, and then actually do bring on the countermeasures as predicted. Above all, these lies are based on an ignorance of the system of interrogation, and of the amount of information already known to the Interrogator.

The P/W lies about insignificant details, and they can easily be recognised, whereas important matters are reported on truthfully. And so the first breach in the hurriedly erected house of false statements soon leads to complete collapse. Most lies are vague and do not even cover the concrete details of the battle, but are given to represent the P/W as a person who cannot be expected to have any comprehensive knowledge, and whose interrogation would therefore not be worth while.

We then find the story that the P/W was shot down while on his first mission; that he was detailed as substitute man to a completely unknown crew at the last moment before the take-off; that he did not take part in the briefing for various reasons, and, therefore, has no idea of the objective; that as a simple Sergeant, he could not have any knowledge of technical and tactical matters; that he is not interested in anything connected with the war as his only desire is for the war to end, etc. etc.

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The direct lies are not much cleverer either. For example, he assigns to a newly established unit the squadron markings and number of an old unit, because he believes these are already known; he gives the names of officers who have long since been withdrawn from active service; or attempts to muddle the names in the various crews, or denies he knows well known names and faces.

There is no doubt that the preconceived, and carefully planned and discussed false story is the exception to the rule.

These paltry little lies prove that the P/Ws have no clear idea as to what the interrogation is aiming at. They cannot differentiate between the essential and the unessential, they lack training, and are not quickwitted. Above all, hardly any P/W who attempts to tell lies has given much thought as to how he must act if and when his lie is recognised as such. It is at that moment that the P/W becomes so insecure and soft that he tells much more than he would have if he had not attempted to tell a lie.

Another aspect altogether is whether the honest statements of P/W are at the same time correct. The Interrogator must judge and decide this with the help of his knowledge of human nature, and his familiarity with the subject concerned. To sum up, it may be said that information gained through interrogation, after it has been evaluated, is reliable and worthy of belief. Experience has confirmed this conclusively.

#### XI. THE USE OF STOOL PIGEONS.

German and British stool pigeons were used at the beginning of the war in order to obtain additional information, or to confirm already known facts. As the Interrogation Unit grew in size, the results from this source did not improve, on the contrary they steadily became worse because the men could not be given the necessary care and attention.

In order to make the work of stool pigeons really successful, it would have been necessary for several Interrogators to work exclusively for them. The fact that these men failed, or stopped working was usually due to insufficient guidance by suitable German officers. The individual agent was forced to look after himself too much, was given too little to do, and had too much time to think things over. He also in time gained a knowledge of what went on behind the scenes, and saw exactly how much information was derived from interrogation, which gave him much food for thought. In some cases he was even unmasked by his fellow countrymen and immediately wanted to cease working in order to save his own life.

Other reasons why agents stopped working included the fact that it was impossible to supply suitable quarters and additional food, and the German money earned could not be exchanged for goods; again, the limited freedom of movement also played a part. Stool pigeons require a great deal of care, and much time has to be spent on them if they are to work efficiently.

There were various opportunities for employing stool pigeons, and the following are some examples. British agents might be installed in the overflow; when the Interrogation Unit was still small the overflow had a British staff which remained in the camp permanently. With a little skill and care an agent could easily be attached to this staff, and when P/Ws had been interrogated they were sent to the overflow, and there had to comply with the necessary

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formalities in order to acquire food or Red Cross parcels. It did not occasion much surprise if some additional military matters were asked or confirmed in the course of the questioning. The details could be obtained almost without difficulty as the P/Ws felt they were safe when they were among their own countrymen.

The result of this type of interrogation was limited to the designation of the unit, political matters, or causes of the aircraft. Really important technical details could not be learned in this way. A detailed technical questioning by the stool pigeons would have betrayed him after a very short time.

A stool pigeon could warn the Camp Officer of indications of any attempts to escape, or of the assembly of information on interrogation methods which would be passed on to England.

In 1943 the overflow was found to be too small and a larger Transit Camp was established first at Frankfurt and then at Wetzlar. The British staff in the overflow was disbanded and distributed among the permanent camps. An Interrogator disguised as a severely wounded British Paratrooper was put into the same room with flying personnel in order to determine the true morale and political views of the P/Ws. Without taking part in the conversation himself, he was able to hear the details of their general morale.

Another opportunity for the use of stool pigeons was in the transport from the last railway station to the P/W Transit Camp. A German who speaks the language without any trace of accent was put into a British or American uniform, joined the newly arrived transport with a guard, and was then taken along to the Interrogation unit. There was sufficient opportunity on the way to ask the P/Ws about their units, and other general questions.

It did not work well to put two P/Ws, of which one was a German Interrogator, in British uniform or even a British stool pigeon into the same room. The P/W to be interrogated immediately showed restraint and distrust in his conversations with the strange comrade. His Intelligence Officer had repeatedly warned him of such a possibility before he had been taken prisoner. The most modern types of listening equipment were installed in 50 of the 200 cells. Every conversation, even if only carried out in whispers, could be tapped and recorded on a magnetic strip. This equipment was found to be particularly valuable in innumerable instances.

Once the Interrogator had succeeded in establishing contact with the P/W, it was simple enough for him to bring the P/W to the point where he wanted to talk to another member of his crew, or some other P/W. Although the P/Ws counted on the presence of such equipment and only spoke in whispers at first, in time the conversation became livelier, and often resulted in valuable additions to the interrogation, or did away with difficulties which had arisen in the course of it. Innumerable examples could be given here for the use of the listening equipment.

## XII. THE EVALUATION OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EFFECTS.

At the beginning, the Interrogator carried out the interpretation of captured documents together with the interrogation of the P/Ws. It was soon found, however, to be necessary to divide the two subjects. This was due in part to the ever-increasing number of crashes following the intensification of aerial warfare and the strengthening of the enemy Air Forces, and in part to the

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number of crashes in which there were no live P/Ws and only documents for information. The deciding factor for a division of the interrogation and interpretation sections was the first 1,000 bomber raid on Colegrove on 31st May 1941, in the course of which more aircraft were shot down in one day than had been brought down in the whole of the previous two months. The decision to make the division was facilitated by the fact that the Kommandant of Dulag Luft wanted to hand over censorship of letters to the other P/W Camps, as this responsibility for all Air Force mail had, up till then, yielded poor results in relation to the personnel required.

The new Interpretation Section which was to be created would then have available sufficient personnel who were both familiar with the matters of interest to the G.A.F., practised in reading various handwritings, and in making excerpts and translations of letters and diaries of airmen who had been shot down. The Interrogators had already been giving them this kind of work to do from time to time. This new section, which to begin with continued to censor the P/W mail, also carried out a censorship of the enemy daily and technical press, as well as all available foreign aviation handbooks.

It was soon found that the picking up and forwarding to the centre of captured documents and effects was by no means carried out with the desired thoroughness and speed. It was, therefore, necessary to instruct all authorities concerned to send to the Interrogation Unit even the most insignificant scraps of paper from aircraft which had been shot down, or had crashed. This had to be done by means of personal contact, instruction leaflets, regulations on the salvage of crashed enemy aircraft, and to a certain extent instructions published in the press.

The latter had to be done with caution so that the enemy's attention was not drawn to the scope of our evaluation of captured materials. Unfortunately just as the whole thing began to work smoothly a new delaying factor was introduced by the increased difficulties in transport and communication, and extra pressure of work on the salvage units. The Press Liaison Section was separated from the Documents Section in November 1943. At the same time, due to the influx of large numbers of regulations and reports in the course of our own or enemy large-scale operations, it was necessary for a certain number of evaluators to work almost exclusively on a series of voluminous translations or synopses. Particularly capable men with extensive technical knowledge were sometimes required for this work.

#### Organisation:

1. Material from each crash was sent separately with exact details of the location, date, and time of crash. If any material could not be tied up with a known crash, then at least the time, location and circumstances of its discovery were to be reported.

2. Personal property taken from P/Ws, and kept separate, was sent to the P/W Transit Camp with exact details of the time, location and circumstances of the capture. The handling of material at the Interrogation Centre was carried out in the following manner:

The documents section designated a number to each crash and every package or bag was given this number. All objects which were not a source of information, such as watches, pens, knives,

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valuables, escape packages, etc. were taken out and returned to the P/W on his release from the camp, provided they were his personal property and were not subject to confiscation (weapons, keys and other objects which would aid in an escape). Foreign currency was credited to the P/W for exchange into camp money or held for the P/W until the end of his captivity. The P/Ws were not allowed to have any money other than the camp money.

The documents having been examined, and marked with the Crash Number (if a number had not yet been designated because the crash report was still missing, the documents were marked with the P/W's name and other details concerning the date and location of the crash), were then sent to the permanent library for captured documents and material, where they were entered under their proper number in a memorandum book (British bombers in a notebook marked KE = Kampfflugzeuge Englisch, and American bombers in a notebook marked KU = Kampfflugzeuge USA, etc.). The material was then stored on shelves.

The evaluation of documents was done in a large room equipped with long tables, and boxes for waste paper. The examiner could immediately separate the wheat from the chaff before he undertook the written examination.

The immediate object of this examination was to find out about the last mission, and unit and base of the aircraft. In addition, information was sought which might throw light on the following subjects:- operations, tactics, organisation, transfers, ground organisation, equipment, training and supplies, meteorology, losses, morale, and economic conditions. In other words anything concerning the enemy Air Forces, or the situation in the enemy countries. The information thus obtained was recorded under the above headings in a documents report. If the only information forthcoming was the names of dead airmen, this was entered on a circular form for the Crash List and the Squadron History files. In the same manner, information of secondary importance which might be of use to the interrogators, such as details concerning a specific squadron, or mission, was recorded in a report made specially for the Interrogators. Up to a certain point the evaluation also covered technical questions, such as W/T, signals communications and navigation, in-so-far as these were of general tactical interest. The documents in question were, however, sent to the experts on the subject for specialised technical, radio or navigational examination. If any queries arose in connection with the documents, the examiner could contact the Interrogator and attempt to clear up the matter by interrogation.

Generally speaking, the principle was to show the P/W as little material as possible. The P/W was kept in the dark as much as possible regarding the source of the knowledge with which he was confronted by the Interrogator. During this war, even, the security service intercepted reports by British airmen about their experiences under interrogation, which had been sent through very clever channels. It had to be assumed, therefore, that other such reports had got through with P/Ws who had succeeded in escaping to Great Britain. Clearly, then, we ourselves would be closing the sources from which we expected the material to flow, if we unnecessarily showed the P/Ws the sources of our information.

It was found advisable for examiners to specialise in various subjects, such as bombers, fighters, Mosquitoes, airborne troops, the southern zone, etc. At the same time an examiner had to keep

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himself well enough informed on other subjects so that he could take over other work at any time.

Requirements.

The enemy himself supplied the greater part of the maps, which had the added advantage that the examiner could work with the same maps as the enemy. The following items were also required, atlases (British airfield atlas issued by the G.A.F. Operations Staff, an André atlas, a special atlas of the United States with an index), an index of towns in Great Britain, a Bottin for France and Paris, telephone directories of France, the R.A.F. and French Air Force yearly lists, British and American service regulations and textbooks of all kinds, and lists of airfields from enemy sources. In addition, various files were established in order to facilitate the work. In the course of time the following files were found essential for the work.

Characteristics File. In which all the characteristics of a specific unit were assembled, e.g. the way in which the service regulations were numbered, the covers for radio documents, mess cards, tickets for station lotteries, deviation cards, signatures of those in charge of the printed material, the lettering on the escape bundles, etc.

Passport Photograph File. assembly and analysis of passport photographs carried on operations by the enemy. These were carried for the purpose of making false passports through the escape organisation in case of a forced landing in the occupied western countries. In the case of the USAAF it was possible to determine the unit from these photos without much difficulty, but this was more difficult in the case of the R.A.F., as the escape photographs of the latter were often issued at the reconversion or reserve training units.

Ration Card File. The way in which the ration cards, which were completely uniform for all USAAF units, were cancelled made it possible to determine the squadron with great accuracy.

R.A.F. Identity Card File. The identity cards formerly used by the R.A.F. often made it possible to deduce the career and even the unit of the bearer. This, however, was not so when it was ordered that all previous entries must be inked out. Uniform identity cards for all flying personnel were issued shortly before D-Day on June 6th, 1944, and by a detailed analysis of the new identity cards, it was still possible to determine the Bomber Group, and sometimes even the unit in question. (Comparison of the serial numbers, the numbers of the stamps and the signatures.)

USAAF Identity Card File. The identity cards for the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers of the USAAF made it possible to determine the unit after a detailed comparison of the numbers, and issue series, as well as the signatures. These identity cards have lately not been found as frequently as usual, and it is possible that they are no longer taken on operations.

Metereological File. The weather forecasts also allowed conclusions to be drawn as to the unit to which the aircraft belonged. Furthermore, when assembled in large numbers they made it possible to make a study of the weather conditions during which operations were flown or cancelled.

/Raid...



Raid Routes. Collection of routes used in each raid in order to classify all route maps and to differentiate between the new and old, and also to identify the operation from which only half-burned or portions of maps were retrieved. This file was also of great value in preparing a summary of the enemy's tactics, for example against our defences.

Flight Formation File. The custom of giving pilots of USAAF bombers flight formation plans made it possible to identify the squadron from the arrangement of the plans, in addition to obtaining details of operational strength, and flight formation of the whole group. If flight formation plans of the same unit were obtained frequently, it was possible to determine the frequency with which the individual aircraft or crews were sent out on operations. In a case where all other information was lacking, it was possible to identify an aircraft by its numbers and tactical markings, as indicated on the flight formation plans. Since these plans also included the names of the pilots, it was possible to recognise the crews of the leading aircraft who might otherwise have passed unnoticed during interrogation.

Place File. contained not only those places known to be connected with a field, but also names of places near the airfield to be found on railway tickets, laundry bills, etc. and so identify the unit.

Airfield File. Contained the names of all occupied airfields together with the units stationed there. This was always kept up to date.

Station Number File. Served to identify the USAAF airfields in Great Britain, which often only had a number, and the Allied airfields on the Continent.

Squadron File. Contained the designations of all known enemy units. Their locations and equipment were continually kept up to date.

Attack File. Made it possible to look up immediately whether, when, and with which type of aircraft any given target in Germany had already been attacked. This file was important in order to recognise the enemy's future policy when plans of future attacks were captured. It also served to identify unclassified log pages from attacks already carried out.

Factual File. This was initiated in order to find out quickly if and when a report had been issued on any given subject. Its main purpose, however, was to prevent duplication of reports, and to clear up points or terms of interest whose last reference was not easily to hand.

Bomber Code Cover File. The number of the cover, and the inscription on the inside made it possible to deduce the unit concerned. This file was very useful at the beginning, before the passport photograph file was enlarged, but it lost its value in the course of time.

Target Day-Book. contained the co-ordinates of all targets. With the help of this book it was possible to recognise the target straight away when co-ordinates were found on maps.

Example: 5118 N 1152 E - by looking up page 51/11 these co-ordinates were found to be Lützkendorf. This file was of good

/service



service when co-ordinates of small or unfamiliar targets were found on maps. In such cases the target was not specifically marked and had to be deduced from the route tracks.

The Main File: In order to save time it was found necessary to file according to subject all information obtained by the Interrogators. This made it possible for the Interrogators to look up complete details of any subject. This file was based on interrogation reports, evaluation of documents and technical reports.

Information obtained concerning the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. was kept separate, and two independent files were kept at the same time. As the material increased daily both in the number of pages and subjects, it was found necessary to take prolific subjects out of the main file, and collect them in special files. The number index had to be expanded continually as a result of the ever-changing aerial warfare tactics. In accordance with new aspects which grew with the work the index also had to be re-organised.

The following procedure was found to be the most practicable: The director of the main file worked on the material to be entered without delay, and marked the information to be entered in the file. The material was then taken over by the person undertaking the compilation. He then marked the information with its proper number, cut it out and pasted it on a sheet of paper which bore the corresponding number of the index with the addition U or E. As soon as one sheet was full it was put away in a folder containing other finished sheets bearing the same number. The information was then immediately available to anybody who required it.

The file was mainly used by the Interrogators, or other sections of the interrogation unit, but it was also available to the men of operational units who were attached to the Interrogation Unit in order to study specific questions.

In order to avoid overloading the file and thus making it harder to use, various subjects were summarised from time to time. These summaries were then taken into the file in place of the individual notes.

List of the Fighter Rendezvous Points. The Americans usually assembled the code letters for the points of rendezvous for their fighter cover into a word. During the attack on Berlin on 3/2/45, for example, the word was "helping" and was made up as follows:

H = Zwolle	I = Berlin
E = Dümmer See	N = Wittenberge
L = Hannover	G = Lüneburg
P = Stendal	

This made it possible to date notes in which the fighter rendezvous points were mentioned, provided the words had been collected regularly.

Abbreviations. It was also found necessary to establish a large file of all abbreviations used by the enemy.

Air Force Slang. The large number of slang terms which were continually being used made it necessary to keep a file for them, too.

/The



The above-mentioned records were not all of equal value; some were better than others. For example, the passport photographs of the R.A.F. brought practically no useful results, whereas the U.S.A.A.F. photographs were a certain and infallible means of identification. When the occupied territories were recaptured again, however, it was no longer necessary for the enemy airmen to take along such photographs. Other means of identification which had up till then been in the background increased in importance during the next period. An important axiom, therefore, was that anything which in any way identified the unit of an enemy airman was to be collected and kept available.

Personnel: It may be said on principle that the type of work in the Records and Editing Sections made it necessary for each examiner to be capable of independent thought, to stick to the facts, and do his duty without supervision. A good knowledge of the language and conditions in enemy countries was just as much a basic requirement as the ability to draw the proper conclusions from the information received. The work of the section was to a great extent a partnership of interests. Each examiner always had to keep in touch with the others, and not stick obstinately to a difficult question because of misplaced ambition to work out a thing by himself.

Summary: The captured documents and material section was originally only supposed to forward the material to the Operations Staff for further examinations. In other words, the evaluation of the information obtained from the material was originally done elsewhere. Summaries were then compiled in answer to the needs of the P/W Interrogators, who were at all times able to fill in gaps and clear up any doubtful points by questioning the P/Ws. Among these were summaries on:

- a) British and American air training schools, which were covered extensively;
- b) Air training in Great Britain and the United States;
- c) Airfield lighting systems in Great Britain;
- d) Alternative routes in case German nuisance raiders, or long range nightfighters were over the base when British night bombers returned from operations;
- e) German A.A. lanes which the enemy had recognised;
- f) The point of view used by the enemy in fixing his plans for operations against the industrial targets in Central Germany;
- g) Lanes of flight from and to England, altitudes used on approach and departure, etc.;
- h) Abbreviations and terms used in navigation.

The first summary of this kind was a report on the large-scale attack on Cologne on 31/5/1941.

Higher Commands had at that time considered it doubtful whether 1,000 aircraft had actually taken part in the operation. It was then the unit's task to combine the information from records concerning the strength of the individual squadrons, with the information obtained from P/W Interrogation, captured documents,

/and



and the Interception Service. It could thus be established which units had taken part, and be judged fairly accurately the minimum and maximum number of aircraft which had taken part in the operation.

Conclusions Drawn:

In the Interception Service and T.L.R. they felt they had to resist any attempt on the part of the unit to evaluate radio or technical documents. It was found that, particularly in the case of innovations such as the hyperbola system of navigation, an immediate evaluation at the unit was of the utmost importance, if only to clear up questions still outstanding. It was found advantageous for the documents section to work on these questions also. The key to the solution of the Micro-H-System (German code word "Schleuderball"), for example, was found by an evaluator of the documents section.

Experience unfortunately showed that the information obtained through the evaluation was not always granted the attention it deserved. This was seen after the first large-scale attack on Cologne, when the unit found it difficult to get its figure accepted on the number of aircraft actually taking part during this attack. The following was another, particularly unfortunate, case; the first plans for an attack on Brück were found in an aircraft which had been shot down on 22.3.1944. No target so far inside the Reich had ever been attacked before. These plans were included in a report issued at the end of April. The attack took place on May 12th without Brück having been warned. No countermeasures had been taken at all and the number of casualties reached several hundreds.

It is difficult to list any special tricks which can be used in the work of evaluation. It depended on the mentality, memory and comprehensive knowledge of the individual examiner, and his ability to put two and two together. Only one attempt to mislead the document evaluators was ever discovered, and that was in the second year of the war, when the R.A.F. navigators made up their lists of English airfields to look like a list of targets in Germany worked by means of an extremely simple code. The main difficulty in document evaluation was that only a small part of the material fell into our hands undamaged, and it therefore left many gaps. Added to this was the fact that it was extremely difficult for the uninitiated to interpret handwritten notes or code names, abbreviations, and figures seemingly written down at random, rough sketches, etc.

XIII. POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL INTERROGATION.

Alongside the purely military information, which is important for the conduct of the war, the systematic questioning of P/Ws on political and industrial matters also added to the information. The P/Ws come from all classes of society, and have all kinds of occupations in civilian life. The fathers, brothers and sisters of a large number of the P/Ws were also working and the P/Ws were familiar with details of their work. In the case of young men who had not been in business long and who did not occupy key positions, a suitable Interrogator, who was acquainted with the industrial set-up and the characteristics of the country in question, could collect many bits of valuable information which, when assembled, gave valuable data concerning the industrial and military strength of the enemy.

This type of interrogation was only very limited during the first 4½ years of the War, although the very briefing material required for this type of interrogation was available in the files of T.L.R.



#### XIV. CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER FORMATIONS.

The Interrogation Unit must have a good source of information concerning operations which have been carried out, and the visual, radio and radar observations made in connection therewith. A well conducted communications system is essential in order that the various units in the zone of operations may quickly forward these details. This communications system is discussed in another section. In addition to such a communications system, the units in the zones in which operations have been carried out must know what to look for, and be able to make suggestions.

It was found that this co-operation was encouraged by sending Interrogators to pay personal visits to the operations staffs of the G.A.F., and flying units. The Interrogator would give them an idea of the scope of the information about the enemy, and they would say what they had observed, giving their difficulties during their own offensive or defensive operations. The personal contact between the various units which was established by these visits gave each an insight into the work of the other. Real co-operation could not be expected unless these units were told of the existence and use of the Interrogation Unit.

There were many gaps in the practical co-operation between the various units during the first years of the War. One of the reasons for this was the strict secrecy which veiled the work of each individual unit, and gave nobody an insight into their work. In a few cases this was due to petty jealousy between the units themselves, and the fear that the other might be the first to obtain and publish some information. It was not until it became absolutely necessary, through the increasing commitments and intensive technical development of the Air Force, that these contacts became close enough for a lively exchange of ideas to take place.

Co-operation with the Operations Staffs of the G.A.F., the operational units themselves, the Interception Service, the German Navy, the A.A. and the enemy equipment examination detachments was found to be particularly fruitful. As an example of this co-operation the following instance concerning the Interception Service and the Interrogation Unit may be quoted.

A fighter pilot was interrogated. At first he refused to make any statements at all. However, when the Interrogator repeated the very words he had exchanged with another pilot during flight, he visibly lost his internal resistance. He was by then so convinced of the comprehensive knowledge of the interrogator that he allowed hitherto unknown information to be drawn from him.

#### Communication through Official Channels:

The relaxation of official channels, which should have been effected right at the beginning, was not put into practice until very late, and then only when it became an absolute necessity. It was found practical for higher formations, such as the Luftflotten, Luftgaukommandos and Jagdgeschwader, to send questionnaires direct to the Interrogation Unit in order to avoid a delay. Posts for Liaison Officers to these higher formations were created, and the liaison officers themselves were able to meet frequently. It was also found practical to inform the units concerned straight away of the results after questions were cleared up. This was done either by telegram or telephone.

/Generally



Generally speaking it took too long to answer questions by means of interrogation reports which were forwarded to the units concerned by the operations staff. The information was found to be no longer of immediate interest, and had become of second rate importance, because of the large number of subsequent enemy operations, by the time the unit received the report. A priority on questionnaires naturally had to be limited to questions of operational importance required for tactical decisions. All other questions had to be answered via the operations staff, or else the Interrogators would have been kept off their main work of interrogating too much.

It is noteworthy in this connection that the operations staff found it practical to have the Interrogation Centre and documents evaluation section at the same location.

Right from the very beginning the Interrogation Unit received innumerable enquiries concerning the reasons for an aircraft crash. If half as many tactical questions had been received, both higher and lower formations might have been a good deal wiser than they were. Questions concerning crashes had to be refused categorically, otherwise a special crash section would have had to be added to the Interrogation Unit.

To sum up, it may be said that questions asked by operational units, and by the many C.A.F. officers who visited the unit, proved that the information collated into reports at the expense of a great deal of work was not passed on for the general use of the units.

It would require a special study to determine whether this confirmed fact was due to the units' dislike of paper work, the information itself being presented unattractively, or because the establishment of German units did not provide for an Intelligence Officer. If the post of Intelligence Officer had been created earlier and filled with a suitable man, particularly in the flying units, who would have undergone uniform training at regular intervals, results would have been much better.

#### XV. SUGGESTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE LECTURES TO OUR ARMED FORCES BASED ON INTERROGATION EXPERIENCES.

Experience in interrogation shows that nothing must be left undone in connection with the intelligence training of our Armed Forces, and that all units must be instructed in the proper conduct in captivity.

There are numerous proofs and indications that statements of German P/Ws have given the enemy a comprehensive picture of the strength, organisation, tactics, establishment and equipment of the German units.

Repatriated German P/Ws have repeatedly pointed out that, because of the lack of intelligence training, they were not always able to conduct themselves properly during the interrogation. The work of the enemy was very appreciably facilitated by the lack of uniformity in the German identity papers, and the informative nature of our paybooks. In most cases it was unnecessary even to ask for the unit as it could be obtained by some other means, such as rubber stamps, Feldpost numbers, etc.

/The



The enemy P/Ws were equally uninitiated in this respect at the beginning of the war, but as time went on both the soldiers and airmen were trained to such an extent, that they at least had an idea of how an interrogation worked, and had been told of the pitfalls in numerous lectures. It also became more impossible to make deductions from the papers that P/Ws carried along with them.

All recommendations by the Interrogation Unit to change the manner in which German paybooks were to be filled out, such as erasing the previous units, or introducing a uniform rubber stamp for all units, etc., were of no avail.

Even the men in the operational units, who were the most likely to fall into enemy hands, were not issued with uniform identity papers. Entries showing promotions, or participation in courses, were made with the complete designation of the unit.

The German Feldpost numbers offered the enemy a sure way of studying the existing organization. A knowledge of these numbers alone was often enough to determine the unit, when a paybook or other identity papers were not available. This could be done without the German P/W even realising when he gave his Feldpost number. It has already been pointed out that the creation of an Intelligence Officer appointment (on establishment) is considered to be particularly important.

As a result of his special training, and through that his knowledge of the systems used in interrogation and evaluation, he alone knows the countermeasures to this work. It must, therefore, be his task to give repeated instruction and lectures to the troops.

From the wide field of enemy information at his disposal he will also be able to make suggestions to his own unit, and to introduce aids and systems already tried out in practice by the enemy.

The enemy was particularly clever and inventive in the creation of escape aids. Compasses and maps, as well as files, were hidden in their flying clothes. It was usually purely accidental when these articles were found. For example, compasses were worked into pencils and pipes, or were camouflaged as trouser buttons. Shoulders were padded and tobacco pouches were lined with maps. Foreign currency was hidden in boot heels, etc.

To sum up, it may be said that the principle of giving name, rank and serial number only, and no other information, has proven to be the best and only way of giving away as little information as possible during interrogation.

A country that has signed the Geneva Convention will, within certain limits, hold to it under all circumstances. An Interrogator will never carry out the most serious threats, as this would expose the P/Ws of his own country to reprisals.

The best course during interrogation is to conduct oneself in a correct and military manner, to salute the Interrogator, to tell no lies, and to be friendly at all times. The P/W who is well mannered and amiable thereby disarms the Interrogator and makes the already difficult task more difficult.